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Introduction
Many volatile factors influence the performance of infrastructure and these yield a range of 
uncertainties when forward-looking investment decisions are being considered. This article 
is restricted to consideration of physical infrastructure, which has a wide spectrum of such 
factors. It includes physical events such as earthquakes that are beyond the influence of 
humankind, other events for each of which there is a very small probability of occurrence, 
and events that will almost certainly occur at some point within any reasonable period 
of time. It also includes economic events relating to uncommon financial episodes and 
common, but uncertain, volatility in demand and cost. Rare physical events have implications 
for investment in infrastructure that provides some mitigation of the effects of these 
events. In so doing, there is a trade-off between providing in advance for remotely likely 
but substantial events in specific, and usually costly, redundancy infrastructure, and having 
an economy with the resources to deal ex post with natural disasters. Obviously, some 
intermediate position will be socially desirable.
This article considers investment in 
infrastructure taking into account more 
immediate risks. It argues that demand 
should be responsive to infrastructure’s 
direct and indirect costs and risks; 
and that, where economically feasible, 
pricing2 will facilitate management of 
these risks and so enable a desirable level 
of investment in infrastructure. Much 
infrastructure – e.g. roads, electricity 
and gas transmission, broadband and 
telecommunications networks – provides 
platforms on which consumers interact 
in various ways that affect the utilisation 
of the platform. Without consumers 
revealing their willingness to pay for these 
platforms, investment is unlikely to meet 
the test of being socially desirable. This 
issue is placed in perspective below by 
consideration of the effect of incentive 
regulation on investment.
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Infrastructure investment once 
made is sunk – i.e. not recoverable in 
nearly its entirety – and typically entails 
economies of scale in investment, even in 
infrastructure maintenance expenditure.3 
These features and uncertainty in demand 
mean that provision of infrastructure 
is investment in capacity that services 
demand rather than in demand per se. 
When combined with volatility, these 
features complicate the evaluation of 
infrastructure investment.
Volatility and economies of scale
There is volatility in both demand and cost, 
with the extent of volatility depending on 
the nature of the industry. Technological 
change affects cost and demand, and where 
it is rapid – as in telecommunications – 
its effects on investment decisions can be 
significant.
Demand volatility, and hence risk, 
arises where there is competition in modes 
of delivery – for example, as between 
road and rail, and for gas pipelines as 
between alternative fuels and locations 
of customers. Even the utilisation of gas 
pipelines can exhibit very high volatility 
in demand at different locations in the 
network of pipes. To illustrate: between 
1995 and 2003 the flow through one of 
the Natural Gas Corporation’s piplines 
fell from the capacity of 500 terajoules 
(TJ) per period to 50 and rose back to 
400 TJ; during this period other pipes 
were stranded as their gas flows fell to 
zero. This substantial variation evidences 
very considerable demand risk that must 
be assessed in advance when evaluating 
investment in capacity that will be 
irreversibly sunk once in place.
Cost uncertainty also arises due to 
variation in technological change, and a 
range of other factors. PBA (2004) report 
that cost variation can be attributed to: 
the price of inputs such as labour and 
materials; the level of competition; the 
level of supply and demand; project 
size and location; legal and regulatory 
requirements; constraints imposed by 
local authorities; choices between new 
construction and use of established 
locations; design and construction 
standards; and the efficiency of the 
project and contract management. 
While cost uncertainty is reduced as a 
project becomes more specific – e.g. in 
location and design – much uncertainty 
may remain. An analysis of tenders 
for 30 roading projects in Auckland, 
Christchurch and Wellington as reported 
by Transit New Zealand (2006) suggests 
that on average the range of tenders 
for the same project was 26% of the 
maximum tender. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) re-
ported on project quotes for four catego-
ries of investments across six electricity 
lines companies. The results reported in 
Table 1 indicate a very substantial varia-
tion in potential construction costs.4 By 
way of illustration, if the quotes were 
normally distributed, a lines company 
contemplating an urban 11kV project 
would be of the order of 95% certain that 
the spread of quotes would be 55%–155% 
of the average quote received. Variation, 
and thus prospective risk, is reduced by 
negotiation as the project is finalised, but 
risk remains.5
Table 1: Variability of infrastructure 
construction costs
Under-
ground Transformer
11kV 
urban
Coefficient 
of 
variation 17.8% 40.1% 27.8%
Economies of scale in investment 
arise where the larger the capacity 
provided by the investment, the lower 
the per-unit cost of the extra capacity. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1, where 
economies of scale are 10%: i.e. 0.9 units 
of investment are required to produce 
1 unit of capacity. Constant economies 
of scale in investment would be where 
investment was 1 for 1 with capacity. 
In Figure 1, investment in two steps 
obviously has a much higher investment 
cost than investment in a single step.
The conjunction of volatility 
and investment economies of scale 
complicates infrastructure investment 
decisions. On the one hand, a large 
increment in capacity will yield lower 
construction costs per unit of capacity 
than will a multi-stage investment. On 
the other hand, with uncertain demand 
growth there may be inadequate demand 
for the larger capacity. Typically, capacity 
is expanded iteratively, trading off these 
two factors: where demand is more 
uncertain, the higher is the likelihood of 
the smaller increment in capacity being 
socially desirable, despite its higher cost. 
Figure 2 indicates the decision rule 
in the case of volatile demand, and 10% 
economies of scale in infrastructure 
investment. Demand and capacity are 
on the vertical axis and time on the 
horizontal. Demand (x) is volatile and 
must be served, and capacity (s) is 
irreversible (sunk) but declines without 
investment at a fixed rate of depreciation. 
The socially optimal decision rule is to 
invest whenever demand equals capacity 
and at that time increase capacity 
beyond the amount required to meet 
immediate demand. This decision rule 
is a consequence of the presence of 
investment economies of scale (see Evans 
Figure 1: Economies of scale in investment
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Cost if 
1 instalment
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Figure 2: Demand, capacity and scale economies
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and Guthrie, 2006), and it is affected by 
the variability in demand.6 Building an 
extra unit of excess capacity allows the 
firm to connect new customers in the 
future without investing (at higher cost), 
but it destroys the option to wait and 
assess if such customers will arrive.
Project evaluation and regulation
The concurrence of risk and irreversible 
investment materially affect investment 
decision making (see Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994; Guthrie, 2009). The key effect is to 
render it socially desirable that the varia-
tion in demand and cost be a critical ele-
ment in the investment decision.7 In par-
ticular, investments that seek to maximise 
the expected present value of the sum of 
producers’ and consumers’ surpluses into 
the foreseeable future should consider the 
timing of the investment, not just wheth-
er, if carried out, it will be socially ben-
eficial at the date of evaluation. In situa-
tions of risk and irreversible investment 
it is generally desirable that there is some 
delay beyond this date. The delay enables 
some resolution of uncertainty. If the in-
vestment climate improves, much less is 
lost by delay than would be lost by im-
mediately (irreversibly) investing and the 
investment turning out to be bad because 
demand (cost) turns out to be low (high). 
The larger the risk – or variation of de-
mand and cost – the larger the private 
and social benefit of the option to delay. 
Economies of scale may induce a longer 
waiting period to invest because increased 
surety of demand increases comprehen-
sion of the effect of building a larger ex-
pansion in capacity, and thereby gain the 
cost advantages of economies of scale in 
investment.
The interactions among risk, 
irreversible investment and economies 
of scale have been the Achilles heel of 
incentive regulation of infrastructure 
assets. It is useful to consider why 
this is so because it foretells the sorts 
of institutional arrangements that 
facilitate socially desirable investment in 
infrastructure. In New Zealand and in 
some other countries it was proposed 
that such infrastructures as transmission, 
pipelines and telecommunications be 
subject to incentive regulation in which 
the regulated price be set at a level that 
financially just supported the most 
efficient firm in its delivery of services, 
independently of the actions of the firm 
being regulated.8 The efficient price to be 
calculated was set as a price that would 
just enable a hypothetical, efficient firm 
to exist and provide existing services. The 
effect of this on firms’ decision making is 
illustrated by examining its effect on the 
valuation of the infrastructure firm.
A firm looking forward from some 
date t has a valuation given by:
value(t) = expected present value of 
revenue less expected present 
value of costs
The expected present value of costs 
contains the sunk cost of the capacity 
in existence at date t, as well as expected 
future investment in the network. 
Consider the effect of this incentive 
regulation price setting where demand 
has to be served, there is 10% investment 
economies of scale and uncertainty about 
future costs and demand: both sources of 
uncertainty are reflected in the valuation 
of the firm that owns the infrastructure. 
The valuation makes some allowance for 
economic uncertainty (systemic risk) in 
the level of its discount rate but it does 
not include uncertainty about the very 
many other risks to the project’s social 
and private viability. In this setting, Evans 
and Guthrie (2006) depict a firm that 
holds an existing capacity of 100 units 
and an associated rate base of K(t), and a 
regulator setting allowed revenue for the 
infrastructure provider as follows:
• Case I: just sufficient revenue for 
the firm to keep operating but not 
enough to start up by building the 
(existing) network from scratch: this 
requires setting revenue to cover the 
expected cost of additional investment 
but it disallows accumulated past 
investment. 
• Case II: just sufficient revenue for the 
firm to start up and keep operating. 
• Case III: just sufficient revenue for 
the firm to start up, keep operating 
and not lose value when it expands 
capacity. 
The Case I firm is just willing to 
operate using its existing assets: that 
is, those put in place in the past and 
depreciated. Because it is earning no 
return on its existing assets the revenue it 
receives just covers its expected capacity 
expansion cost. At low demand it makes 
little profit and hence has a low valuation 
at that level of demand. But its profit 
increases as demand increases – and its 
network is more fully utilised – until the 
point where the firm’s anticipation of the 
cost of investing in expanded capacity 
outweighs the revenues per unit of 
demand. As demand approaches capacity, 
the probability of having to invest in 
expanded capacity increases to the point 
that the expected cost outweighs the 
revenue allowed per unit of demand. 
Thus the value of the firm declines: by 
enabling the firm to just cover expected 
investment cost, the value of the firm 
where demand equals capacity is zero. 
The Case I firm would never start up, for 
its value lies below its replacement cost: 
this situation arises where existing assets 
are not allowed to, or cannot, earn a 
competitive rate of return. The decline in 
value at higher levels of demand means 
that the firm is contemplating investment 
in capacity that will have a negative pay-
off to it.
In Case II, the firm is allowed just 
enough revenue for it to start up and 
continue operating. Its situation is as 
for Case I, but with a minimal revenue 
stream covering both existing assets and 
additional, but prospective, investment. 
This firm will have a valuation greater 
than its replacement cost at moderate 
levels of demand, but it will try to avoid 
investment in additional capacity, because 
as demand approaches capacity the firm’s 
valuation falls, even below its optimised 
the case I firm would 
never start up, for its 
value lies below its 
replacement cost: this 
situation arises where 
existing assets are not 
allowed to, or cannot, 
earn a competitive rate of 
return. 
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replacement cost (ORC). The revenue 
assigned this firm is insufficient for it 
to invest and maintain its value when it 
faces network expansion. The reason for 
this result is that revenue will be reset 
as the revenue required to just support 
a hypothetically efficient firm that 
produces the same level of services as 
the firm in Case II. This revenue will be 
based upon the cost of building a single 
network and hence must be lower than 
that required to just support a firm that 
makes incremental decisions over time 
because of the presence of economies 
of scale. Put another way, while the firm 
makes incremental capacity decisions 
anticipating uncertain demand, the 
regulator sets the price after the firm’s 
decisions, applying the economies of 
scale to the whole firm and with no 
uncertainty about demand. The ex post 
actions of the regulator take place with 
more information than the firm had 
when it made decisions, and they utilise 
economies of scale more extensively.
If there were no economies of scale, 
but rather constant returns to scale, the 
firm does not lose value by expanding 
network capacity and thus has the 
incentive to invest in new capacity as 
required under incentive regulation. 
Comparison of constant returns to scale 
and Case II illustrates why incentive 
regulation fails in the case of economies 
of scale in investment. Scale economies 
must produce a conflict between the 
regulator and the firm in which the firm 
seeks to reduce its investment relative to 
that desired by the regulator. 
In Case III, the firm has sufficient 
revenue that its valuation does not 
decline as demand approaches capacity. 
Evans and Guthrie explain that, in 
the presence of investment economies 
of scale, this desirable state can only 
be achieved if the firm is allowed an 
inordinately large return on its assets: a 
return that would not be contemplated by 
a regulator. It is for this reason that pure 
incentive regulation fails where there are 
economies of scale in investment. These 
economies exist for most infrastructure 
and hence pure incentive regulation is 
unsuitable for it. In many cases, pure 
incentive regulation has been replaced 
by historical cost regulation, where 
there is intense regulatory oversight 
and approved infrastructure investment 
projects are included as capital in the 
rate base. 
Demand and investment
Cases II and III illustrate that where 
demand must be satisfied at prices that 
approach the cost of infrastructure 
services, it will be a challenge to achieve 
the socially desirable level of investment 
where there are investment economies 
of scale. If price is set at a level that 
just covers the cost of a replacement 
firm, society will have to subsidise the 
infrastructure provider to achieve the 
desirable level of investment.9 If a price 
is set that just covers the incremental 
costs the firm incurs with its sequence of 
investments so that the firm is agreeable 
to investing, it will no longer be incentive 
regulation: it will be approved investment 
management. In this situation, demand 
management becomes as important as 
investment management. In Case II, the 
firm’s conflict with the regulator might 
be resolved by allowing excess demand 
to reach some level before investment 
takes place, even in the presence of 
investment scale economies. Indeed, this 
has been an approach long advocated 
by some.10 The income generated by the 
jump in number of customers using the 
infrastructure at the time of investment 
enables the firm to not lose value at the 
time it invests. Whether this means that 
the firm invests at the socially desirable 
time will be affected by whether it has 
competition or is subjected to regulation 
that precludes it making excessive rents 
from congestion.
Excess demand requires prioritisation 
of use of the capacity, and this may 
be achieved by pricing where it is 
economic, or by congestion broadly 
conceived.11 Congestion pricing for 
infrastructure importantly allocates the 
capacity to those who most value its use, 
and it provides information about the 
willingness to pay for an expansion in 
infrastructure. Both features are highly 
desirable if not essential if investment 
in infrastructure is to be at a socially 
desirable level.
1 This paper draws heavily on work with Graeme Guthrie.
2 Indirect costs include costs imposed by individuals that 
affect others. These suggest prices such as congestion 
prices that enable consumers of infrastructure to express 
their demand for it while paying the cost of externalities 
induced by their use of the infrastructure.
3 Economies of scale in investment mean that the larger 
the quantum of investment, the lower the cost per unit of 
service or output of the additional capacity.
4 The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of the 
quotes for the same project divided by the average quote 
for that project.
5 The risk may well be shared between the investor and the 
construction company.
6 And variability in cost, where this exists.
7 Although some firms’ decisions may differ from those 
preferred by society.
8 In a number of countries this approach has been applied to 
calculating access prices for telecommunications services: 
see, for example, the widely used forward-looking cost 
concept of total service long-run incremental cost (TSLRIC). 
In New Zealand, this regulation was proposed for lines 
companies by the Commerce Commission but was never 
actually implemented.
9 This is the dynamic analogue to the classic static depiction 
of natural monopoly. The need for a subsidy changes the 
concept of the desirable level of investment.
10 The argument was advanced as long ago as 1970 by 
Baumol and Bradford in a setting without risk but with 
growing demand. A second approach not considered here 
is to charge bundled, or two-part, tariffs: these may reduce 
consumer surplus at any point in time but bring forward 
investment in capacity to the benefit of future consumer 
and producer welfare.
11 Congestion can take various forms that represent reduced 
service quality – e.g. delays and poorer service – and be 
managed by prices, administrative rules or laissez faire 
which is unlikely to be socially desirable for infrastructure.
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